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Abstract. We reconsider the provably collision resistant Very Smooth
Hash and propose a small change in the design aiming to improve both
performance and security. While the original proofs of security based on
hardness of factoring or discrete logarithms are preserved, we can base
the security on the k-sum problem studied by Wagner and more recently
by Minder & Sinclair. The new approach allows to output shorter digests
and brings the speed of Fast VSH closer to the range of “classical” hash
functions. The modified VSH is likely to remain secure even if factor-
ing and discrete logarithms are easy, while this would have a devastating
effect on the original versions. This observation leads us to propose a vari-
ant that operates modulo a power of two to increase the speed even more.
A function that offers an equivalent of 128-bit collision resistance runs
at 68.5 MB/s on a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU, more than a third of the
speed of SHA-256.
Keywords: hash functions, generalized birthday problem, knapsacks,
provable security
1 Introduction
A hash function is a mapping that on input a string of arbitrary length outputs
a fixed-length digest. Such functions are among the most basic building blocks
in cryptology. In the recent years there have been several attempts to design
provably secure hash functions. Several of them follow the same general idea
and hash by computing sums in finite Abelian groups.
Very Smooth Hash The function designed by Contini et al. [7] is a provably
collision resistant hash function based on arithmetic in multiplicative groups
modulo an integer. If the modulus is of a proper form, collision resistance of the
function can be proved under an assumption heuristically linked to well-known
problems, such as integer factoring and discrete logarithm. The function is rela-
tively practical, but still considerably less convenient than the established hash
functions. For example, in order to reach collision resistance that corresponds to
1024-bit RSA security, one needs to compute a digest that is 1516 bits long. The
function was reported to be about 25 times slower than SHA-1. It is our goal to
improve the multiplicative VSH in terms of both efficiency and security.
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The generalized VSH-DL variants proposed in [16] are not targeted in this
paper. While the functions output shorter digests, their performance is much
worse than in case of the multiplicative versions.
Knapsack Based Functions From a high level point of view, VSH can be
seen as a multiplicative knapsack. Compression function families based on 0-1
knapsacks in groups were introduced by Impagliazzo & Naor. Such functions
are parametrized by k randomly selected elements of a finite group G denoted
by a1, . . . , ak. The function maps a k-bit string b1 . . . bk to
∑
i∈T ai where T ⊆
{1, . . . k} is the set of indices i such that bi = 1. If k > lg |G|,1 the functions
compress. Under certain assumptions it was shown that the families were uni-
versal and one way. Examples were given in groups (Zn,+) and (Z∗n,×) and the
security of some variants related to hardness of discrete logarithm and factoring
[13, 14].
A similar additive function was proposed by Damg˚ard in [9]. It is again
a 0-1 knapsack, where ai are positive integers and the group operation is addition.
In a concrete example, k equaled 256 and the ai were random integers with
bit length under 120. The function was broken by Camion & Patarin using
techniques that turn out to be central to our paper [6]. Joux et al. successfully
applied lattice reduction to the class functions [15].
Following Ajtai’s discovery of the one-way function related to worst case
assumptions on lattices [1], Goldreich et al. showed that the function is actually
collision resistant [12]. It is a 0-1 knapsack on k random elements of the additive
group Znq for prime q = O(nc) and n lg q < k ≤ q2n4 .
Micciancio generalized the concept to certain rings in [20, 21]. Parametri-
ze the function by k elements of a ring R. For T ⊆ R, define a compression
function T k → R as ∑ni=1 xi ·ai. For appropriate choices of R, the family is pre-
image and collision resistant. Properties of the family are connected to worst-
case assumption on special classes of lattices. For comprehensive treatment of
the family, see also [24, 18]. A practical hash function SWIFFT following the
principles was proposed in [17, 19] and its modification SWIFFTX was submitted
as a SHA-3 candidate [2]. The generalized knapsacks considerably lower the key
length and the number of operations needed to hash a bit. If b = lg |T |, then
kb bits can be hashed in k ring multiplications and k−1 ring additions and only
k ring elements are needed to specify a particular function.
Incremental Hashing Bellare and Micciancio proposed a family of incremental
hash functions in [5]. The functions are designed to map strings of arbitrary
length to group elements. Fix an integer b, assume that the message is composed
of kb bits. Denote the i-th b-bit chunk of the input by xi. Define a function
f : N × {0, 1}b → G and map xi to f(i, xi).2 Obtain k group elements, output
1 lg stands for base 2 logarithm.
2 The f is considered a random oracle in proofs and instantiated by a real-world hash
function such as SHA.
their product in G. The authors define a balance problem in groups and use it as
a security assumption in proofs. The groups considered include (Zn,+), (Z∗n,×),
(Znq ,+), (Zn2 ,+). The functions defined in these groups were named AdHASH,
MuHASH, LtHASH and XHASH, respectively. In case of multiplicative groups,
security follows from hardness of discrete logarithm. The authors observe that
the construction appears more secure than what the proof suggests, there seems
to be no attack even if discrete logarithms were easy to compute.
The (Extended) k-tree Algorithm All the above functions map an input
string of length kb to k group elements that are then added in G. This can be
seen as if we had k lists of 2b group elements each and selected a single element
from every list. This view is valid also for 0-1 knapsacks where b = 1, simply
think of the lists as containing the identity element of G in addition to ai. The
problem of inverting such a function was considered by Wagner, it is known as
the generalized birthday problem [28, 27]. In many groups it can be solved by






where S = lg |G|, provided all the lists
contain enough elements. The idea is a generalization of the attack of Camion
and Patarin on Damg˚ard’s function. Minder and Sinclair extended the algorithm
to cases where the length of the lists is restricted [22].
Recent Provably Secure Hash Functions The fastest known attack on
SWIFFT applies the extended tree algorithm while ignoring the ring structure
and the relation to lattices [19].
Finiasz et al. proposed a code based function FSB that is essentially a knap-
sack in the group (Zn2 ,+) [3]. Joux et al. broke the function applying Wagner’s
algorithm [8]. Later variants of FSB [4, 10, 11] consider Wagner’s attack in se-
curity analysis. This paper is in part inspired by the known applications of the
tree algorithm to hash functions.
Main Contributions We propose two new variants of VSH and interpret them
as knapsacks or k-sums. This brings the function closer to SWIFFT or FSB
and allows us to adapt the cryptanalytic methods previously used on the two
compression functions. We quantify security of the new VSH variants applying
the known results on complexity of the extended k-tree algorithm. This suggests
that our minor modification may improve security by many orders of magnitude
compared to the original VSH variants. We point out evidence that the functions
remain secure even if factoring and discrete logarithms are easy. Practicality of
the new functions is demonstrated on an implementation.
2 Very Smooth Hash Algorithm
We recall two variants of VSH from [7] that are the starting points for our
improvements. Denote the i-th prime number by pi. In addition let p0 = −1.
Fast VSH Let n be an S-bit integer, fix a small integer b > 0. Let k be the
maximal integer such that
∏k
i=1 pi2b < n. Have an l-bit message m, denote the
r-th b-bit chunk of m by m[r] with 0 ≤ m[r] < 2b. The Fast VSH algorithm
proceeds as follows:
1. Let x0 = 1.
2. Let L = d lbk e. Pad the message with zero bits up to an integral multiple of
bk.
3. Append a bk-bit binary representation of l to the message, denote the new
chunks m[Lk + 1] to m[(L+ 1)k].






p(i−1)2b+m[jk+i]+1 mod n .
5. Return xL+1.
Step 4 maps the S bits of xj and kb fresh message bits to a new S-bit value
xj+1. The xj can be viewed as a chaining variable, Fast VSH employs a variant
of the Merkle-Damg˚ard transform [9]. This special chaining mode is made use
of in the original security proof that links collision resistance to the hardness of
the following problem:
Definition 1 (VSSR: Very Smooth number nontrivial modular Square
Root). Let n be the product of two primes of approximately the same size and
let k′ ≤ (log n)c. Given n, find x such that x2 ≡ ∏k′i=0 peii mod n and at least
one of the e0, e1, . . . , ek′ is odd.
The (Fast) VSH security proof establishes that any collision in Fast VSH
leads to a solution to VSSR with k′ = k2b.
Fast VSH-DL If the modulus is replaced by an S-bit prime number p = 2q+1
for prime q, one obtains the Discrete Log variant of Fast VSH. This function
maps Lbk bits to S bits for fixed L ≤ S − 2. It uses the same iteration as Fast
VSH, but because the length is fixed, no length needs to be appended. To hash
Lbk bits proceed as follows:
1. Let x0 = 1.






p(i−1)2b+m[jk+i]+1 mod p .
3. Return xL+1.
The compression function can be extended to process inputs of arbitrary
length by applying the Merkle-Damg˚ard transform. The function is proved col-
lision resistant assuming the following problem is hard:
Definition 2 (VSDL: Very Smooth number Discrete Log). Let p, q be
prime numbers with p = 2q + 1 and let k′ ≤ (log p)c. Given p, find integers
e1, e2, . . . , ek′ such that 2
e1 ≡ ∏k′i=2 peii mod p with |ei| < q for i = 1, 2, . . . , k′,
and at least one of e1, e2, . . . , ek′ is non-zero.
2.1 Security
Security of Fast VSH is related to the hardness of factoring the modulus n. The
designers base the assessment of collision resistance of Fast VSH on the following
assumption:
Computational VSSR Assumption Solving VSSR is as hard as factoring










approximates the running time of Number Field Sieve factoring the integer n.
Heuristically, given k2b solutions to VSSR, one can use linear algebra to
find x 6≡ ±y mod n such that x2 ≡ y2 mod n and obtain factorization of the
modulus. If NFS is assumed to be the fastest method for factoring integers of
the form of n, the VSSR problem is no easier than a fraction 1
k2b
of the cost
of NFS. The above assumption can directly be used to derive a provable lower
bound on collision resistance for a particular Fast VSH variant.
In contrast, no computational VSDL assumption was made in the proposal.
Therefore no computational lower bound on collision resistance of Fast VSH-DL
can immediately be derived.
Generating Collisions Collisions in Fast VSH are trivial to create if the factor-
ization of the modulus n is known. This allows to compute ϕ(n) = (p−1)(q−1).





The product does not change if an integral multiple of ϕ(n) is added to any
of the exponents. Creating messages that lead to appropriate differences in ei is
rather easy. Note that the collisions created in this way are quite long, measuring
some Skb bits. Creating short collisions appears to be a much harder problem,
even if p and q are known.
Similarly, the ability to compute discrete logarithms modulo p leads to an im-
mediate straightforward way to create collisions in Fast VSH-DL.
3 A Variant Without Modular Squaring
We now proceed to modify Fast VSH and Fast VSH-DL such that the collision
attacks from the previous section are no longer possible. The changes we make
preserve the original security proofs.




in Step 4 of Fast VSH compresses its input. It can therefore be extended to
a hash function in the usual ways, such as the plain Merkle-Damg˚ard mode. Our
new Fast VSH variant will impose the condition kb > S and build a compression
function only.
Faster VSH Have an S-bit modulus n, let k, b be integers such that kb > S





p(i−1)2b+m[i]+1 mod n .
The function computes a modular product of precisely k out of the primes
p1, . . . , pk2b . If n = pq, we can prove collision resistance of the compression
function based on the VSSR problem:
Theorem 1. A collision in Faster VSH solves VSSR for k′ = k2b.








ti mod n . (4)







si mod n .
Because m 6= m′, at least one of the exponents on the right hand side equals
one, the above expression solves VSSR. uunionsq
If n is replaced by the prime p = 2q + 1 for prime q, we are in the Fast
VSH-DL setting. In a direct analogy of the original proof we can link the security
of modified Fast VSH-DL to VSDL.
Theorem 2. A collision in Faster VSH-DL solves VSDL for k′ = k2b.
The modular squaring is no more crucial for the security proof. Our modi-
fied function is secure under the original assumptions, the proofs can be easily
adapted to the new setting.
Note however, that our modification limits all the exponents in the prime
products to one. The factoring attack on Fast VSH and the discrete log attack
on Fast VSH-DL do not extend to the modified variants.
Performance The change proposed in this section slows the functions down.
Only bk−S fresh bits are processed per iteration due to the use of the ordinary
Merkle-Damg˚ard mode. In contrast, the original Fast VSH processed bk bits per
iteration. The performance of the modified variant is approximately a fraction
1 − Sbk of the original. The greater the compression ratio of the new function,
the less significant the slowdown.
The proposed modification to Fast VSH does not appear to be beneficial at
all. The mere fact that the original collision-finding attacks do not work is not
worth the performance loss. The security level implied by security proofs is the
same after all.
As we will show in the next section, the modification allows a radical change
in security assessment and in the end permits faster and/or more secure hashing.
4 The k-sum Problem and the Tree Algorithm
The following equivalent view of the two new VSH variants will be useful in
security analysis. Split the primes into k lists L1, . . . , Lk, such that Li contains
the 2b primes p(i−1)2b+1, . . . , pi2b .
Let fi : {0, 1}b → Li be a function that interprets the bit string m[i] as
an integer and returns the element on position m[i] from the list Li. The new
compression functions can be rewritten as follows:
H(m) = f1(m[1]) ∗ f2(m[2]) ∗ · · · ∗ fk(m[k]) (5)
where m[i] is the i-th b-bit chunk of the input m. In the above description,
∗ stands for modular multiplication. For the rest of this section, let ∗ simply
denote a group operation in a finite Abelian group G such that lg |G| ≈ S.
To measure the security of compression functions of the above type consider
the following problem:
Definition 3 (The k-sum problem). Given a group G, an element y ∈ G
and disjoint lists of group elements L1, . . . , Lk find gi ∈ Li such that
g1 ∗ g2 ∗ . . . ∗ gk = y .
Pre-image resistance of our two new compression functions is easily seen to
be equivalent to an instance of the above problem. We show that collisions also
naturally correspond to an instance of a k-sum problem.
Given the k lists Li, form new lists L
′
i containing all the elements gh
−1 for
g, h ∈ Li. Size of L′i is approximately 22b. A collision in H corresponds to
a solution to the k-sum problem with the lists L′i and target value 1. Note that
a solution to the new k-sum problem leads in turn to a pair of colliding messages.
A solution is necessarily of the form g1h
−1
1 ∗ g2h−12 ∗ . . . ∗ gkh−1k . If m[i] ∈ {0, 1}b
is the unique value such that fi(m[i]) = gi and m
′[i] ∈ {0, 1}b is such that
fi(m
′[i]) = hi, then the concatenation of m[i] collides with the concatenation of
m′[i]. This leads to a collision if m 6= m′, or equivalently if the solution to the
k-list problem does not select 1 in all of the lists.3 In general, collision search
for H is as hard as pre-image search for a function (over the same group) that
compresses twice as much as H.
Known Lower Bounds For certain groups, hardness of the k-sum problem fol-
lows from more “usual” assumptions. Wagner shows that the problem in a cyclic
group is no easier than discrete logarithms. Impagliazzo & Naor prove that
a 0-1 knapsack in any group G is hard whenever there is a homomorphism onto
G that is hard to invert [14]. Their theorem easily extends to k-sums.
The connection of k-sums to homomorphisms was also pointed out in [5].
The discrete logarithm is a special case. Squaring in the multiplicative group
of quadratic residues modulo n = pq is another example of an onto homomor-
phism. Solving the k-sum problem in the group is therefore at least as hard as
factoring n.
Wagner’s Tree Algorithm The tree algorithm by Wagner solves the k-sum
problem in about k2
S
1+lg k group operations, provided all the lists contain at least
2
S
1+lg k elements. To simplify the exposition, we deliberately neglect other oper-
ations the algorithm performs, such as sorting and comparisons. The algorithm
needs a sequence of groups Kj normal in G for j = 0, . . . 1 + lg k, such that
K0 ⊆ K1 ⊆ K2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ K1+lg k and |Kj | ≈ |G|
j
1+lg k . In addition, the algorithm
makes use of homomorphisms ρj : G→ G/Kj with Kj = Ker ρj .
Without loss of generality one can assume that the target value y is the
identity of G. For a different y, simply multiply all elements in one of the lists
by y−1 and solve for 1. The tree algorithm successively merges pairs of the lists.
Only “useful” entries that fall in the subgroups Kj are kept. For details of the
algorithm, the reader is referred to [27].
It is not necessary that the Kj form a sequence of normal subgroups of G.
A “weaker” chain of subsets may be sufficient, as demonstrated in Wagner’s
paper for groups (ZM ,+) where a chain of intervals in used. We will further
assume that the structure of G allows the tree algorithm to run with k lists
for any k. This is a strong assumption, the group structure will often limit the
applicability and/or exact performance of the algorithm. Our goal is to estimate
3 We might remove the element 1 from all the lists and limit ourselves to colliding
messages that differ in all b-bit blocks.
the cost of the tree algorithm from below. The assumption well fits the purpose
and greatly simplifies further analysis.
Extended Tree Algorithm Wagner’s analysis assumes the lists are long
enough. If it is not the case, one can combine the short lists into (fewer) longer
lists and invoke the ordinary tree algorithm once the lists are long enough. The




lg k − p (6)
such that p is the least integer satisfying
S ≤ (lg k − p+ 1)b2p . (7)
We will use the two above expressions to measure the security of Fast VSH vari-
ants. To simplify the exposition, we will measure the complexity of a particular
instance of the k-sum problem exclusively by the maximum expected length of
the lists produced. The workload will usually be slightly higher, but a lower
bound on the cost is sufficient for our purposes.
What If Factoring and DL Are Easy? Interestingly, the k-sum problems
over multiplicative groups appear to remain hard even if factoring and discrete
logarithms are easy. The multiplicative group Z∗n for n = pq is isomorphic to
(Zp−1,+)×(Zq−1,+) and the multiplicative group Z∗p is isomorphic to (Zp−1,+).
Suppose we can factor and compute discrete logarithms efficiently. This allows
us to compute the isomorphisms from the multiplicative to the additive group.
While a group isomorphism transposes a k-sum problem instance to a setting
where we may be able to compute faster, the lengths of the lists are preserved.
Even in (Zm,+) no faster approach than the (extended) tree algorithm is known.
For all the multiplicative functions we consider, the cost of factoring and/or
discrete logarithms is negligible compared to the cost of the tree algorithm. We
may therefore simply consider the steps to come for free in our analysis, even if
a run of the tree algorithm is preceded by DL computations.
4.1 Security of Faster VSH
Table 1 captures the collision resistance level implied by the computational VSSR
assumption (“factoring hardness”) and the new security estimates based on the
extended k-tree algorithm for two variants of Faster VSH. The parameters orig-
inate from [7]. The modulus is assumed to be a product of two large primes.
The factoring hardness measure is the complexity of factoring a hard to factor
integer of said bit length. Columns 5 and 6 are computed using (6) and (7).
4 The algorithm was described for XOR as the group operation, but can be generalized
to other groups.
Table 1. Security estimates for variants of Faster VSH
k S b factoring coll coll pre
256 1516 8 1024 bits 2334.7 2502.0
1024 2874 8 2048 bits 2472.4 2616.7
Note that the two security measures are in somewhat incompatible units. The
exponent in column 5 means “bit security”, the number in column 4 is “RSA
security”.
Hardness of factoring a 1024-bit RSA modulus is considered equivalent to
roughly “80-bit” security. If Faster VSH with S = 1516 is assessed as a k-sum
problem, it provides collision resistance of at least 335 bits. For these parameters,
the removal of squarings and the use of Merkle-Damg˚ard mode slows down the
original Fast VSH by approximately 74%. This is only a moderate slowdown
given the great increase in security.
The slowdown is only approx. 35% for the other variant with S = 2874,
while the gap between the hardness of factoring an 2048-bit modulus and 472-bit
security is even greater.
Collision resistance of 335 or 472 bits is more than enough for many years
to come. We can therefore aim for lower security levels and tweak the parame-
ters, in particular the digest length, to gain performance. Precise parameters for
practical instances of the functions as well as speed measurements are given in
Section 6.
5 A Variant Without Modular Reduction
The lower bound on the complexity of the extended tree algorithm only depends
on the number of lists k, the length of the lists 2b and the output length S.
While the structure of the particular group does affect the practicality of the
algorithm to an extent, it almost certainly makes the job harder than what our
estimates suggest.
Because we choose not to rely on the group structure, we propose to replace
the modulus in Faster VSH by a power of two. No costly modular reductions are
needed in the computation of the compression function, because reducing modulo
a power of two can be done for free. This will lead to a considerable speed-up
while maintaining the k-list security. Note that the prime 2 = p1 cannot be used
in this setting, because it does not belong to the multiplicative group of integers
modulo 2S . The lists are to be filled with small primes starting with p2 = 3. To






Any hash value will be an odd number, i.e. the least significant bit is always 1.
Therefore only S−1 leftmost bits of the S-bit modular product should be output.
Call the function Smoother VSH.5
Technically, the provable connection between the security of the function and
the VSSR assumption (or a variant of VSDL) is preserved. This provides little
confidence in security, because factoring the number 2S is trivial and so are
discrete logarithms in (the large cyclic subgroup of) Z∗2S .
The security assessment based on the extended tree algorithm remains valid.
Recall that it does not rely on the modulus, but only on the values k, b and S.
6 Experimental Results
We propose seven parameter sets with varying security, speed, and memory
requirements. All the parameter choices were tailored to meet one of the three
collision resistance levels 2128, 2192 and 2256. The length of the modulus is always
an integral multiple of word size (64 bits in our case). The value b has a significant
impact on performance. Small b results in many multiplications, but keeps the
memory requirements down. With larger b one saves on multiplications, but
needs much more memory. The ideal value is best determined empirically. The
value b = 8 used in all our variants is the most convenient choice also from an
implementation point of view.
The pre-image and collision resistance are measured as list lengths in the
extended tree algorithm. For comparison, in the case of Faster VSH modulo
a product of two primes, we include “factoring” security levels implied by the
Computational VSSR assumption. The one bit difference in output length caused
by the even modulus can be neglected, we consider the two variants equivalent
for the purposes of the tree algorithm.
The modified functions are very simple and quite efficient in software. Our
C implementation uses GNU MP 5.0.1 to perform arithmetic on large integers.
The Faster VSH code uses Montgomery arithmetic to improve performance [23].
The speed was measured on a 2.40 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU running a 64-bit
system. Table 2 displays speed measurements for the variants running in the
Merkle-Damg˚ard mode. The table also captures the total size of the lists of
small prime numbers, represented by three bytes each. All the primes used in
the proposed variants are at most 21 bits long, therefore the product of any three
primes fits in 64 bits. Our implementation processes them in triples to save on
multiplications.
The values in columns 3 and 4 were computed using (6) and (7), column 5
follows from (1) and (2).
Use of the modulus 2S makes Smoother VSH approximately twice as fast
as in the case of a random S-bit modulus M . For comparison, the speed of
SHA-256 on the same platform is approximately 160 MB/s.6 Our fastest variant
with 128-bit collision resistance runs at more than third of that speed.
5 Now we are running Very Smooth Hash modulo a smooth number.
6 OpenSSL benchmark.
Table 2. Proposed parameters for Faster VSH and Smoother VSH
k S coll pre factoring coll memory Smoother VSH speed Faster VSH speed
128 640 2128 2192 375 96 kB 45.5 MB/s 24.9 MB/s
256 768 2128 2170 452 192 kB 63.4 MB/s 33.2 MB/s
512 896 2128 2160 528 384 kB 68.5 MB/s 35.8 MB/s
192 960 2192 2288 603 144 kB 34.0 MB/s 18.1 MB/s
384 1152 2192 2256 727 288 kB 48.0 MB/s 24.3 MB/s
256 1280 2256 2384 839 192 kB 27.9 MB/s 14.6 MB/s
512 1536 2256 2341 1013 384 kB 39.8 MB/s 19.8 MB/s
Note that none of the seven variants of Faster VSH would be considered suf-
ficiently secure based on the original computational VSSR assumption, possibly
with the exception of the last one that is as secure as a 1013-bit RSA modulus.
7 Choice of the List Elements
The analysis in Section 4 assumes the k lists Li contain random elements of the
group G. This is not at all the case for our functions. We deliberately ignore this
and expect the tree algorithm to behave as if the elements were random. Similar
reasoning was used in cryptanalysis of SWIFFT and FSB, where the lists are far
from random [19, 10, 4].
Small prime numbers used in VSH have been known to have two positive
effects. Because a k-list function is defined by k2b group elements, if full S bits
were used for every single entry, the memory requirements would soon become
prohibitive. For the very same reason the function should not be implemented
in its equivalent additive representation.
Another advantage of the use of small primes is speed. Multiplication of the
S-bit modulus by a small (say 21-bit) prime is much easier an operation than
a full S×S bit multiplication. The small prime numbers are absolutely necessary
for VSH to remain practical.
7.1 Minimal Distance of Colliding Inputs
The list elements used in VSH are independent in a rather strong sense. Suppose









and the two inputs differ in precisely l ≤ k of the b-bit chunks that select
a particular element from a list. Given H(m) = H(m′), there is a congruence of






t′i mod n .
At least one of the products must exceed n. Therefore if d is the maximal bit




More precisely, if the first k2b primes are used to fill the lists, the largest
prime is approximately k2b ln(k2b). Its bit length is then
d ≈ b+ lg(bk ln 2 + k ln k) .
Any pair of colliding messages must differ in at least
l & S
b+ lg(bk ln 2 + k ln k)
of the b-bit input chunks.
As an example, if k = 128 and S = 640, then l ≈ 35. For the variant with
k = 512 and S = 1536, the minimal number of different 8-bit chunks for colliding
messages is l ≈ 75.
Although we do not have a more direct link to collision resistance, we believe
this property may support confidence in the functions. Small changes in input
never lead to a collision. This property was in some form present in the original
VSH as well, but (to our knowledge) it was never explicitly described. It is
however considerably easier to quantify in our new setting.
A similar property was derived by Ze´mor & Tillich for hash functions based
on (Cayley) graphs [25, 26].
8 On Provable Security
The main advantage of Fast VSH was the (heuristic) connection to well-known
hard algorithmic problems. The modifications we propose in Sections 3 and 5
drop this feature, security is no longer supported by hardness of factoring or
discrete logarithms.
Although our first modification to VSH preserved the proof, we ignored the
security level implied by the VSSR assumption and measured it in a different way.
This new viewpoint renders the proof and the VSSR assumption rather useless
and provides some justification for dropping the VSSR and VSDL altogether
with the smooth modulus in Section 5.
Note that in case of VSDL and the corresponding variant, there never has
been a hardness estimate leading to meaningful bounds on collision resistance.
All that was known is that discrete logs imply collisions. Our modification unifies
the DL and factoring variants and allows the two to be proved secure based on
a single new assumption.
The modified VSH shares several features with the functions SWIFFT and
FSB. The two are provably secure compression functions also building on the
hardness of the k-sum problem in commutative groups. The main feature shared
is the method for measuring security. All the three function families build on
their own hardness assumptions, originating from number theory (VSH), lattice
theory (SWIFFT) or coding theory (FSB). If the k-sum problem were better
understood, the various assumptions could be replaced by a single universal
k-sum assumption. The functions would then all share a single security proof.
9 Conclusions
We proposed modifications to Very Smooth Hash that allow a radical change in
security assessment. There was no need to apply the extended tree algorithm to
the original multiplicative variants of VSH before, because the known attacks
were considerably faster.
Our new variants of Faster VSH are designed to prevent factoring and DL
attacks. The tree algorithm becomes a useful tool to measure security. We have
shown that (independent of factoring or discrete logarithms) there is a deep
combinatorial problem behind Faster VSH, the same problem that supports
several other k-list hash functions.
We designed a new multiplicative compression function Smoother VSH that
relies exclusively on the hardness of the k-sum problem. The function has still
much longer output compared to “classical” hash functions of comparable se-
curity, but its speed has become reasonable. There is room for improvement in
terms of implementation.
The extreme simplicity and clear structure of the new functions can be con-
sidered advantages. On the other hand, more insight in the complexity of mul-
tiplicative k-sum problems is desirable.
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